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Kremlin watching

With Kyiv signing up to a US-proposed ceasefire in Ukraine, all eyes are now on Putin’s next move

Kremlin watching

Moscow’s Kremlin as seen from across the frozen Moskva River, 19 February 2025. Photo: EPA-EFE / MAXIM SHIPENKOV

Less than a fortnight after Donald Trump and Volodymyr Zelensky had their now-notorious row in the Oval Office and US-Ukrainian relations appeared irretrievably damaged, the two countries have reached an agreement. After nine hours of negotiations behind closed doors in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, negotiators signed off on a US proposal for a 30-day ceasefire, allowing the resumption of military aid and intelligence sharing by the US.

This does not mean that the guns in the war will now immediately fall silent. No ceasefire agreement between the warring parties — Russia and Ukraine — has been signed. In fact, it is not even clear how much detail is contained in the proposal and how much of it has already been discussed with Russia during earlier talks between senior US and Russian officials. Nonetheless, the deal signals a major step forward.

From a Ukrainian perspective, it has several advantages. First, the major rift between Kyiv and Washington has at least been partially patched up. The minerals agreement — on hold since the White House shouting match on February 28 — is back on. Trump has extended an invitation to Zelensky to return to Washington to sign it.

Equally importantly for Kyiv, the resumption of US weapons deliveries to Ukraine and the lifting of the ban on intelligence sharing were part of the deal, and with immediate effect. This restores critical US battlefield support for Ukraine, including for Kyiv’s capability to strike targets deep inside Russia.

By contrast, Vladimir Putin is now in a somewhat trickier position. He has to balance his war aims in Ukraine with the arguably more strategically important goal of rapprochement with the US.

Talks between senior US and Russian officials on 18 February in the Saudi capital Riyadh, seemed to indicate that Moscow had won significant concessions from Washington — including on retaining illegally occupied territory and no NATO membership for Ukraine.

Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha presents US Secretary of State Marco Rubio with an icon in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, 11 March 2025. Photo: EPA-EFE

Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha presents US Secretary of State Marco Rubio with an icon in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, 11 March 2025. Photo: EPA-EFE

These concessions may still be on the table, alongside other US offers to normalise relations and end Russia’s isolation from the West. But this does not mean that Russia will be in any particular hurry to bring the fighting in Ukraine to an end. The country’s economy has weathered Western sanctions remarkably well so far.

Putin is therefore likely to play for more time in an effort to push his advantage on the ground while avoiding upsetting Trump. The deputy head of the upper house of the Russian parliament, the Federation Council, and chairman of its international affairs committee, Konstantin Kosachev, signalled as much after the US-Ukraine deal was announced. He insisted that any agreements would have to be on Russian, rather than American — let alone Ukrainian — terms.

If Putin were to reject the current proposal, he would not only risk a broader reset of US-Russia relations but potentially also lose his current battlefield advantage.

This indicates a willingness to talk but also signals that an agreement, even on a ceasefire, will still require further negotiations.

Playing for time will also allow Putin to avoid rebuffing the American proposal outright. To do so would be a huge gamble. Trump has already proven his willingness to exert maximum pressure on Ukraine — and he seems to have got his way.

Ahead of the US-Ukraine meeting in Jeddah, he was also clear that he would consider further sanctions on Russia to force Moscow to accept an end to the fighting in Ukraine. Both of these steps — pressure on Ukraine and on Russia — are part of a plan developed by Trump’s special Ukraine envoy Keith Kellogg back in May 2024.

Ukrainian sappers clear mines in eastern Ukrarine’s Kharkiv region, 12 March 2025. Photo: EPA-EFE/SERGEY KOZLOV

Ukrainian sappers clear mines in eastern Ukrarine’s Kharkiv region, 12 March 2025. Photo: EPA-EFE/SERGEY KOZLOV

Crucially, Kellogg also envisaged continuing “to arm Ukraine and strengthen its defences to ensure Russia will make no further advances and will not attack again after a ceasefire or peace agreement”.

If Putin were to reject the current proposal, he would therefore not only risk a broader reset of US-Russia relations but potentially also lose his current battlefield advantage, as well as territory Moscow currently controls. That’s because a boost to Ukrainian military capabilities would likely shift the balance of power, at least on some parts of the front line.

The most likely scenario going forward is a two-pronged Russian approach. The Kremlin is likely to engage with the White House on the American ceasefire proposal that has now been accepted by Ukraine while pushing hard for further territorial gains before US-Russia talks conclude.

Whether the proposed ceasefire will become a milestone on the path to peace will depend on Trump’s willingness to exert pressure on Russia the way he has on Ukraine.

The peculiar set-up of the negotiations also plays into the Kremlin’s hands here. Short of direct talks between Kyiv and Moscow, Washington has to shuttle between them, trying to close gaps between their positions with a mixture of diplomacy and pressure. This has worked reasonably well with Ukraine so far, but it is far less certain that this approach will bear similar fruit with Russia.

The temporary ceasefire currently on the table may, or may not, be an important step towards a permanent cessation of violence and a sustainable peace agreement. Whether it will become a milestone on the path to peace will depend on Trump’s willingness to exert pressure on Russia the way he has on Ukraine.

It’s important to remember that Ukraine has already paid a huge price as a result of Russia’s aggression. Any further delay on the path to a just peace will inflict yet more pain on the victim instead of the aggressor.

Stefan Wolff is a Professor of International Security at the University of Birmingham and Tetyana Malyarenko is a Professor of International Relations at the Odesa Law Academy.

This article was first published in The Conversation. Views expressed in opinion pieces do not necessarily reflect the position of Novaya Gazeta Europe.

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