Others are less sure. For many foreign policy observers, Trump’s victory — together with his lukewarm attitude toward NATO, criticism of the amount of US aid being sent to Ukraine and vows to reach a deal to end the ongoing war in Eastern Europe — has stoked uncertainty over Washington’s commitment to doing everything it can to support Ukraine repel Russian invaders.

As a scholar on Eastern Europe, I understand where these concerns come from. But I also offer a counter view: that a Trump White House may not necessarily be bad news for Kyiv.

It is common to hear Trump described as isolationist, nationalistic and an anti-interventionist on the world stage. He has encouraged such a view through claims, for example, that the US would shirk its responsibility to come to the defence of a NATO member against a Russian attack if that country was not meeting its defence spending targets in line with the alliance’s commitments.

But such rhetoric is undercut by established facts and prior Republican positions. In December 2023, the US Congress passed bipartisan legislation prohibiting a president from unilaterally withdrawing the US from NATO. Maintaining the overarching security and stability of Europe is in the US’s interests. The Republican co-sponsor of that bill, Senator Marco Rubio, has in recent months emerged as a key Trump surrogate and is expected to be named as Trump’s secretary of state, according to reports.

The US and Europe remain each other’s most important markets. As such, the US will be highly motivated to maintain a role in European security so long as instability in Europe can influence the global — and US — economy.

Moreover, there is nothing to suggest that the incoming administration will deviate from those of Obama, Biden and indeed Trump’s first term in seeing China as the primary threat to the US, and Beijing has thrown its support behind Vladimir Putin during his military efforts in Ukraine.

Continued US cooperation with allies in Europe will also strengthen Washington in Asia. Direct military cooperation, such as coordinating with the British to produce submarines for Australia, helps the US strategy to counter and contain China’s threat in the Pacific. It would also signal to US allies in Asia, such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, that Washington is a dependable security partner in times of crisis.

Much has been made of Trump’s perceived cosy relationship with Putin. In the run-up to the election, Trump insisted that, should he win, he would bring peace to Ukraine even before he was inaugurated and called Putin “genius” and “savvy” for the Ukrainian invasion.

For his part, Putin congratulated Trump on his victory, praising him for being “courageous” when a gunman tried to assassinate him. Moscow has also indicated that it is ready for dialogue with the Republican president-elect.

Trump’s actual policy toward Russia during his first term was notably more hawkish than these words may suggest. Indeed, there is a good argument that the Trump administration was more hawkish on Putin than the Obama one it replaced.

For example, Trump provided the Ukrainians with anti-tank missiles after the Obama administration had refused to give them such weapons. Also, in 2018, the US withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty, citing previous violations by Russia. In contrast, in 2014, then President Barack Obama accused Russia of breaching the INF treaty after it allegedly tested a ground-launched cruise missile, but chose not to withdraw from the treaty.

Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov referred to that move as “a very dangerous step.” The INF treaty constrained the US from developing new weapons and tied Washington’s hands in its strategic rivalry with China in the Pacific.

Then, in 2019, Trump signed the Protecting Europe’s Energy Security Act, which included sanctions halting the construction of the Russian-backed Nord Stream 2 pipeline directly connecting Russia to Germany via the Baltic Sea. The pipeline, which has since been rendered inoperable by a sabotage attack in 2022, would have bypassed Ukraine, prompting the Ukrainian government to label it an “economic and energy blockade”.

It was one of 52 policy actions undertaken by the first Trump administration to restrict Russia. In contrast, the Biden administration waived Nord Stream 2 pipeline sanctions in 2021, only to reimpose them on 23 February 2022, one day before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Almost three years later, the Kremlin’s war machine still runs on energy revenues. Despite unprecedented Western sanctions aimed at restricting sales of Russian oil, countries continue to purchase from Russia, with India becoming the biggest buyer of Russian seaborne crude oil.

And here a Trump policy not aimed directly at Russia may, in fact, harm Russian interests. Trump has made repeated promises to introduce a new wave of drilling for oil and gas on American soil. And while it might take time for this to filter through to lower prices globally, increased production from the US — already the world’s top crude oil producer — has the capacity to make an impact.

Trump’s return to the White House could mean tougher enforcement of US oil sanctions against Iran, reducing Tehran’s capacity to sell weapons to Russia. Iran has supported Russia both diplomatically and militarily since the beginning of the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. And since 2020, Iran’s revenue from oil exports nearly quadrupled, from US$16 billion (€15.2 billion) to $53 billion (€50.3 billion) in 2023, according to the US Energy Information Administration.

Predicting what Trump, a notably unpredictable leader, will do in power is difficult, and US foreign policy can be a slow-moving beast, so one should not expect immediate breakthroughs or major surprises. But his record serves as a counter to the views of observers who have suggested that his victory does not bode well for Ukraine.