The recent replacement of Valeriy Zaluzhnyi as commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces may have put a temporary end to the increasingly public disagreements between the very popular “iron general” and the Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky. But it has not answered the fundamental question of what a winning — or even surviving — strategy in the war with Russia could look like as it moves into its third year.

Several dynamics have come together that are deeper and more complex than just a major reshuffle of the military leadership. The bigger picture that will shape the future of the war — and with it the future of Ukraine and the European and international security order — comprises four main factors. These need to be analysed together to understand the present, and, most importantly, the future predicaments of Ukraine and its western partners.

First, the failure of the Ukrainian counteroffensive in 2023 and the increasing pressure that Russia has put on Ukraine’s frontlines and hinterland put into serious question the ability of Kyiv to win. This is especially the case if victory for Ukraine means forcing Russia’s complete withdrawal from all territory occupied since 2014.

The fall of Avdiivka, a town in the Donetsk region of eastern Ukraine, suggests that Kyiv ultimately has a weaker hand to play in a battle of attrition when confronted by a ruthless adversary with greater resources.

Much like the loss of Bakhmut in May 2023, or Soledar in January 2023, this was a symbolic rather than strategic defeat for Ukraine. It also represents, at best, Pyrrhic victories for Russia, as in the case of Bakhmut.

But taken together, and seen in the context of the failed 2023 counteroffensive, these were not just symbolic defeats. They marked a real and extremely wasteful loss of financial resources, manpower and military equipment.

Zelensky’s dismissal of Zaluzhnyi puts the blame for last year’s disappointed hopes clearly on the latter. It also more worryingly indicates that the Ukrainian president has failed to learn important lessons from these setbacks. The fact that the new commander-in-chief, Oleksandr Syrskyi, is associated with several of these costly defeats — notably Bakhmut — does not bode well for the necessary change in Ukrainian strategy.

To his credit, Syrsky also masterminded the defence of Kyiv in the early days of the war in 2022 and the successful counteroffensive the following summer which saw Ukraine recapture significant territory first around Kharkiv in the north and then Kherson in the south. Notably, these successes happened before Russia embarked on the first of several mobilisations and shifted its economy to a war footing.

The second factor to keep in mind is that Ukraine’s battlefield successes in 2022 occurred at a time when Western support for Ukraine was in full swing. Those days are long gone. This has been evident in the protracted battles in the US congress over sending more military aid to Ukraine. Recent comments by former president and 2024 Republican nominee-apparent Donald Trump on his lack of commitment to NATO should he be re-elected in November are equally worrisome.

Despite some detractors, the EU remains committed to supporting Ukraine. This became clear following the recent agreement on a new €50 billion funding package for Ukraine through 2027. But this will barely cover Ukraine’s budget deficit, let alone make up for a potentially significant drop in US military aid. Combined with Ukraine’s own shrinking domestic capabilities to mobilise further resources, the war will have to be fought in far more difficult conditions than in the first two years.

Meanwhile, Ukrainian society is increasingly suffering from war fatigue. Military setbacks, economic decline, deteriorating living conditions, corruption and the scale of the loss of lives — among troops and civilians alike — makes sustaining the war effort at present levels more difficult as well. Especially if the goal remains retaking all the land that Russia has occupied since 2014.

The amended law on mobilisation, intended to underpin this strategy, was adopted in the Ukrainian parliament on 6 February. Its provisions, including lowering the conscription age from 27 to 25 years, mandatory digital certificates and electronic prescription notifications and stricter penalties for evading military service, are further evidence of the waning enthusiasm in Ukrainian society for the war effort.

Together with yet another 90-day extension of martial law and several financial measures designed to tighten the government’s control over the economy, the more draconian provisions in the new mobilisation law also heighten the sense of uncertainty over Ukraine’s political direction.

Zelensky’s presidential term comes to an end in May and new parliamentary elections would normally be due in the autumn.

This will ultimately be an issue for the constitutional court to resolve. But it has not stopped political forces within Ukraine opposed to Zelensky and his Servant of the People political party from piling pressure on the president to agree to a government of national unity.

Given the opposition’s lack of popularity, associated primarily with former president Petro Poroshenko whom Zelensky defeated in a 2019 landslide, this is hardly driven by popular demand. But it nonetheless signals further political turmoil at a time when Ukraine needs unity.

It is not clear whether Zelensky’s dismissal of Zaluzhnyi will strengthen or weaken any political opposition. In the short term, it is likely to benefit Zelensky, whose popularity still dwarfs that of Poroshenko. Yet, because replacing Zaluzhnyi has not come with a signal that Ukraine’s war strategy will fundamentally change, this is a very risky move on the president’s part.

Maintaining the current direction asks Ukrainians for yet more sacrifices. What Zelensky is offering in return depends on a range of at best highly uncertain outcomes dependent on many factors beyond the Ukrainian president’s control.