Lukewarm alliance

On the battlefields in Ukraine and in the waters off Japan, a diplomatically isolated Moscow grows increasingly dependent on Beijing

China has enabled Russia to pursue its war in Ukraine, and more recently to agitate Japan over the disputed islands that Tokyo refers to as its Northern Territories. Leaked records indicate that at least 46 tons of drone material have been sent from China to a sanctioned Russian company this year. Naval drills between Moscow and Beijing have escalated, with 60% of all joint exercises since 2009 taking place since the full-scale invasion. This strong yet informal alliance is, however, based on calculated benefit rather than trust, as threats of Chinese espionage and divergent geopolitical outlooks strain relations between Moscow and Beijing.

Critical dependence in Ukraine

Russia has relied on China as a crucial partner in its war against Ukraine: as an energy customer, military supplier, economic anchor and diplomatic ally.

Cheap Chinese components are crucial for both capitals to keep up with demand on the battlefield. Russia’s latest generation of drones in Ukraine shows that Moscow, like Kyiv, can develop increasingly sophisticated weapons. Analysis of Geran-5 drones shot down by Ukraine has revealed that they contain Chinese parts. This latest version, faster and sturdier than its predecessor, is much harder for Ukrainian air defences to shoot down.

Maria Snegovaya, senior fellow at the Washington, DC-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), told Novaya Gazeta Europe that “Russia has no choice but to remain dependent on China because of [Beijing’s] significance, its willingness to assist Russia, and its relative autonomy from Western sanctions.”

She added that Moscow “doesn’t have a lot of options” as “there aren’t many countries willing to become Russia’s ally,” pointing to growing ties with North Korea for technology and manpower as an example.

While Russia has turned to North Korea and India for economic support in recent years, experts argue that these relations can only supplement, not replace, Moscow’s entrenched dependence on China.

Russia has relied on Beijing for its supply of critical parts — including jet engines, onboard computers and fibre-optic cables — since the start of the full-scale invasion. A recent analysis by the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC) found that China has exported $10.3 billion (€9.03 billion) worth of export-controlled items since 2022. This includes dual-use goods, which can be repurposed for military use.

Beijing has consistently maintained that it does not supply “lethal weaponry to either side of the conflict” and that it “strictly controls dual-use items.”

The USCC report emphasized asymmetric relations in China’s favour, with Beijing gaining discounted energy, military expertise, and broader economic gains. Meanwhile, “Beijing avoids binding alliance commitments that would obligate it to match Russia’s risk-taking,” the report said.

Absence of security guarantees or defence pledges, as well as spy fears, have put limits on this alliance. Leaked documents from Russia’s security services, obtained by The New York Times, laid out plans by authorities to defend against Chinese espionage. CSIS’s China Power Project has recorded four cases of Russian nationals passing sensitive data to China since February 2022.

Snegovaya also blamed their uneasy partnership on clashing strategic interests. She said that “the Chinese benefit from the international order [as it is]”, while “Russia is undermining [it].”

Michal Bogusz, China expert at the Centre for Eastern Studies in Warsaw, said that while Russia’s position as a junior partner does provide Beijing with serious leverage, it is unlikely to pressure Moscow as long as the war does not escalate beyond Ukraine’s borders. He said that “the survival of an anti-Western, anti-democratic, authoritarian regime in Russia [is in China’s interest]”, adding that, in this regard, “Putin, or Putinism even without Putin” remains the best option for Beijing.

‘Muscle-flexing diplomacy’ towards Japan

As Russia fights a war in Europe with China’s help, the two countries have also adopted an increasingly assertive posture together towards Japan.

In August, Vladimir Putin visited Iturup, one of the disputed Kuril Islands that, since 1945, has been controlled by Russia but claimed by Japan. The trip came shortly after Russian and Chinese forces held live-fire military drills in Tokyo’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The previous month, Chinese and Russian warships conducted a joint patrol through several strategically important waterways around Japan.

Putin’s trip, his first to the contested islands, prompted an immediate protest from Tokyo. Following the visit, Moscow’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova said that “Russia’s sovereignty and jurisdiction over [the islands] are beyond question.” She also condemned Japan’s support for Ukraine, accusing Tokyo of “complicity in the Russophobic policies of the collective West.”

Snegovaya said that Russian operations alongside China in the waters off Japan “conveys a very strong signal” to Tokyo about the depth of Moscow’s ties with Beijing, and their potential as a security threat. This is particularly important as China has sharply intensified its pressure on Japan.

Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s remarks in November 2025 that a Chinese attack on Taiwan could constitute an “existential crisis” for Japan sparked the latest diplomatic dispute with China, which in turn has accused Tokyo of remilitarizing.

Since then, Beijing has banned more Japanese companies from receiving its exports, flown bombers near southwest Japan (alongside Russia), and placed tight restrictions on rare earth minerals necessary for manufacturing.

While the exact reasons for this escalation remain unclear, Snegovaya suggested that Moscow sees Tokyo’s growing integration with the West as a “security dilemma” and is seeking to penalise Japan for its continued support for Ukraine.

In September, Tokyo also protested the erection of a 50-foot statue in Khabarovsk in Russia’s Far East which depicts a Soviet soldier shattering a post engraved with the Japanese chrysanthemum emblem. The flower remains a symbol of Japan and the Japanese imperial family.

Bogusz said that the escalation of joint naval drills is part of Moscow’s efforts to deepen its alignment with Beijing. “Russia has enough resources on its own [to intimidate Japan]. They want to do it together with China, not because they need the Chinese, but they want to prove how useful they are” for Beijing’s own posture against Tokyo.

He added that Moscow wanted to send the message that “we can continue the war on Ukraine, but we can also be a danger in different parts of the world.”