No pushover

It has, for example, progressed on its path to EU membership. Moldova transitioned from applicant to candidate status several months after the outbreak of the war and formally opened accession negotiations two years later. The government is now carrying out reforms to align with EU standards.

Such progress was not a foregone conclusion given the many challenges Moldova has faced as a result of the war in Ukraine. The country was an early destination for Ukrainian refugees, which put significant pressure on already stretched public services and resources.

With a decades-old foothold in Transnistria, a breakaway region in eastern Moldova, Russia also seemed to have a springboard for conflict escalation in Ukraine’s rear. This foothold gave Moscow a possible destination to push westwards along the Black Sea coast, too.

Russian false-flag operations in April 2022 seemingly provided further evidence that Moscow planned to destabilise Moldova. And one year later, the so-called soccer plot underscored Moscow’s intention to continue its efforts against Moldova. This was a Russian-planned and sponsored attempt to infiltrate Moldova with saboteurs from Russia, Montenegro, Belarus and Serbia.

Perhaps the most serious challenge for Moldova came in January 2025, when Ukraine stopped the transit of Russian gas through its territory. Transnistria, which had for decades been kept completely dependent by Moscow on Russian gas supplies, was plunged into an immediate crisis.

The authorities there cut off central heating and hot water to all residential buildings. They also ordered the closure of industrial enterprises not involved in making critical food products. The impending humanitarian disaster and ensuing information war between Russia, Moldova, Transnistria and the EU over who was to blame posed a serious threat to stability in Moldova yet again.

In addition, two Moldovan elections in recent years presented the Kremlin with an opportunity for interference. Yet, despite Russian meddling, Moldova’s incumbent pro-Europe president, Maia Sandu, secured a second term in 2024. Her party then won another absolute majority in parliamentary elections the following year.

So, how has a small country wedged between Ukraine and Romania with a decades-old conflict of its own managed to withstand Russian pressure?

Early in the war, the most serious danger for Moldova was an escalation of the conflict in Transnistria. While this may have served Moscow’s interests, politicians in Moldova and Transnistria were keen to preserve stability in their relations.

On the Transnistrian side, this was mainly driven by economic interests. The region has been part of the deep and comprehensive free trade area between Moldova and the EU since 2016, and 80% of all exports from Transnistria now go to EU countries.

Economic stability also helps ensure the continuation of the ruling Transnistrian regime. Business and political interests there are often one and the same, embodied in the all-dominant Sheriff conglomerate.

Sheriff dominates Transnistria’s economy, operating a network of supermarkets, gas stations, construction companies, hotels, radio and TV stations and a mobile phone network. It also controls the political party Obnovlenie, which runs the government in the regional capital, Tiraspol.

At the same time, stability reduces the risk of a humanitarian crisis and a refugee wave that could destabilise Moldova. Maintaining the relatively substantial levels of confidence that has been built between the two sides was therefore high on the agenda of politicians in Chișinău and Tiraspol.

The ability of Moldovan and Transnistrian politicians (helped by EU assistance) to avoid a major escalation of the energy crisis in 2025, as well as keeping relations generally stable and predictable over the past four years despite Russian disruption efforts, bodes well for the future.

The Moldovan state budget continues to earmark resources for joint projects involving communities on both banks of the Nistru River, which separates Moldova and Transnistria. This included €1.5 million for 30 projects in 2025, bringing the total investment to over €11 million across more than 600 projects since 2011.

However, while Moldova has weathered storms over recent years effectively, there are still threats to its stability. For example, challenges to the reintegration of Transnistria into Moldova remain. After more than three decades of separation, there are significant social, political, economic and legal hurdles to overcome.

On the one hand, the fact that chief negotiators from both sides met again face-to-face in late February after a 15-month hiatus indicates their commitment to making progress and resolving their differences peacefully and through dialogue. But, on the other hand, there are some signs that trust between the two sides remains fragile.

On the eve of the meeting, Sandu signed a decree revoking the Moldovan citizenship of nine people who serve in the governmental structures of Transnistria. Two of them had also fought against Moldova during the brief civil war in 1992 that created Transnistria. The timing of the decree was condemned by the Transnistrian side for putting undue pressure on Tiraspol.

As Sandu recently acknowledged on the anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, her country’s survival is due to the heroism of Ukrainians in defending their country and thereby keeping Russia away from Moldova. But beyond simple survival, Moldova seems to have emerged stronger from the challenges it has faced.

At a time when the narrative of inevitable Russian victory against Ukraine is beginning to crumble, it is important to remember the limits of the Kremlin’s power. Russia’s neighbours, through their own efforts and with support from their European partners, are not the helpless pawns that Moscow wishes them to be.

This article was first published in The Conversation. Views expressed in opinion pieces do not necessarily reflect the position of Novaya Gazeta Europe.

Stefan Wolff is professor of International Security at the University of Birmingham and Marina Gorbatiuc is a researcher at the Centre for Political Research and International Relations at Moldova State University in Chișinău.